Remilitarization

Remilitarization is read across seven groups of evidence. Each group answers a different question.

New defense asks whether capital is backing the new entrants: software, autonomy, drones, launch and space-based ISR. It holds the public names (PLTR, KTOS, AVAV, RKLB, KRMN, VOYG, FLY, RDW, MRCY, BKSY, PL, LUNR, ONDS, RCAT, BBAI), the Global X Defense Tech ETF, and the defense-tech basket. The best-funded new entrants (Anduril, Shield AI, Saronic, Epirus) are private and absent until they list.

The primes asks whether the legacy contractors are being re-rated too, or only the new entrants. It covers LMT, RTX, NOC, GD, LHX, HII, BA and the services integrators, plus ITA, XAR, PPA, and NATO (which adds the European primes).

Government spend asks whether budgets are rising and whether that money is being obligated. It holds US national defense spending (BEA, quarterly) and the same as a share of GDP (NIPA basis, which reads above the COFOG measure), monthly DoD contract obligations (USAspending, with a 90-day reporting lag), and Quiver's contract velocity.

Industrial base asks whether the money has reached factory order books: defense capital-goods new orders and backlog (Census M3), defense aircraft orders, and the Fed's defense and space production index.

Global spend asks whether this is a US story or a world one. It holds general government defence spending as a share of GDP for the EU, Poland and Japan (Eurostat and OECD COFOG), the EU total in euros, China's official defence budget in dollars, and a dollar total across the US, the EU, the UK, Japan, Australia, Norway and China's official budget. That total is not world military spending, and China's official budget sits well below independent estimates of what it spends. COFOG series are annual and arrive about fourteen months after the year ends; China's budget is announced each March.

Manpower asks whether people are joining. It holds the Army's active-duty recruiting as a share of its annual goal (from year-end releases, entered by hand) and US search interest in "join the military" and "military draft".

Attention & risk asks whether the press and the public are watching war. It holds the Caldara-Iacoviello Geopolitical Risk index (its threats sub-index, its military-buildups category, and the US, China, Russia and Taiwan country indexes), GDELT's share of world news events that are armed or material conflict, the Palanor Geopolitical Stress Index, search interest in "World War 3", "Taiwan invasion" and "China war", retail interest in "defense stocks", Brent crude, and gold.

Belief is computed live. The skeptic side holds the evidence that the world is calming: the market-implied probability of a Russia–Ukraine ceasefire within six months, and GDELT alignment between the US and China, the US and Russia, and Russia and Ukraine (higher = more cooperation). Individual stocks are context; the baskets and ETFs carry the believer weight so no single name can swing the read.

Alignment asks whether the lines are hardening between the powers that matter. Daily GDELT alignment for US–China, US–Russia, Russia–Ukraine, China–Taiwan and Israel–Iran, and Fan (2025)'s annual series: US–China alignment, US average alignment, and the share of US relationships below zero. Fan's events were compiled by a language model, not by hand, and that release ends at 2024.